Recent Cases by Editors,
[Vol. 99
RECENT CASES
Civil Rights-Federal Civil Rights Act § 47(3) Permits Civil Ac-
tion Against Private Individuals Who, Pursuant to a Conspiracy, Vio-
late Another's Federal Rights-Appellants, members of a California
Democratic Club, were conducting a meeting to discuss United States for-
eign policy and to pass a resolution opposing the Marshall Plan. The appel-
lees, private persons acting pursuant to a conspiracy, attended the meeting,
intimidated and assaulted appellants and forced the club members to dis-
perse. In a civil suit for damages, brought under § 47(3) of of the Federal
Civil Rights Acts,' the district court granted appellees motion for dismissal 2
on the grounds that § 47(3) does not establish a cause of action against
private individuals, but only gives a right of action against those who act
by virtue of some state authority. On appeal, the Circuit Court reversed
the lower court,3 holding that appellants did have a cause of action under
this statute. Hardynan v. Collins, 183 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.) cert. granted,
19 U.S.L. Week 3096 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1950).3a
Following the Civil War and the adoption of the post bellum amend-
ments to the Constitution, Congress passed a series of civil rights statutes
for the purpose of insuring fair and equal treatment for the fi-eed negroes.4
Congress at that time thought that the Fourteenth Amendment granted it
the power to protect all the civil rights of citizens from any violation.5
This belief was proven erroneous when the Supreme Court decided that
dual citizenship and dual rights exist under our federal system; 6 that the
Fourteenth Amendment imposed constitutional restraints only upon the
states and not upon private citizens. 7 Thus, Congress had no power to
1. 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 8 U.S.C. § 47(3) (1946) states that "if two or more
persons . . . conspire or go in disguise on the highway . . . for the purpose of
depriving . . . any person . . . of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy . . . if
one or more persons . . . do . . . any act in furtherance of the object of such con-
spiracy, whereby another is injured . . . or deprived of having and exercising any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived
may have an action -for the recovery of damages . . ." (Italics added.) This Act
will be referred to as § 47(3).
2. Hardyman v. Collins, 80 F. Supp. 501. (1948).
3. The decision was two to one, Healy, J., dissenting.
3a. The instant case has been cited in support of an action brought under
§§47(3) and 48. Robeson v. Fanelli, 19 U.S.L. Week, 2237, 2238 (D.C.N.Y. Nov.
10, 1950).
4. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68, 382-83, 607-08 (1871).
5. See CONG. GLOBE, supra, Appendix 69 (1871). See Note, 49 HARV. L. REV.
935 (1936).
6. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873).
7. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court
said, "Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
[Fourteenth] amendment." Id. at 11. This doctrine has not gone uncriticized;
see, e. g. The dissent of Justice Field in the Slaughter House Cases. supra, at 96;
Frantz, Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 LAW GUILD REV. 122 (1949).
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prevent private individuals from violating the rights of others whenever
those violated rights were derived solely from state laws.8 That left only
a narrow area of rights which Congress could protect from the invasions
of private citizens.9 These rights owe their existence solely to the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States and to the implied power, inherent in
Congress, to take necessary and proper steps to preserve the essential
republican nature and vitality of the Federal Government."0 Thus, Con-
gress can enforce the observance only of federal rights; should it attempt
to enforce any more than that, it exceeds its constitutional power. This
reasoning accounts for the fate of § 5519 of the Revised Statutes,"- a
criminal act punishing conspiracies to deprive individuals of their rights
under "the laws". This act was held invalid in United States v. Harris 1
2
because Congress sought to punish where it had no constitutional power
to do so. But the defect of § 5519, i.e., its coverage of both state and
federal rights, was not found to exist in § 241 of the Criminal Code,13 which
punishes conspiracies to violate only federal rights. This act has been con-
sistently upheld.14 Though § 47(3), the statute involved in the instant
case, was designed to protect the same rights as were enunciated in § 241,15
its provisions were almost identical with § 5519 with the one important
exception that § 47(3) makes specfic reference to deprivation of rights of a
"citizen of the United States", while § 5519 omitted any such reference.'8
The instant court holds that though some provisions of § 47(3) seem to
encompass other than federal rights and are hence open to constitutional
objections, these are severable from the provisions which provide a civil
8. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629 (1882) ; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
9. See Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43-4 (U.S. 1867); United States v.
Reese, supra at 217; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 629, 666 (1882).
10. See Ex parte Yarbrough, supra, at 666; In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 536
(1895) ; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875). See Hale, Uncon-
stitutional Acts as Federal Crimes, 60 HARv. L. REv. 65 (1946).
11. RFv. STAT. § 5519 (1875), repealed by 35 STAT. 1154 (1909). "If two or
more persons . . . conspire, or go in disguise on the highway . . . for the pur-
pose of depriving . . . any person . . . of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . each of such persons shall be
punished . . ."
12. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Supp. 1949) states: "If two or more persons conspire to
injure, . . . or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise . . . of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . . or
if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway . . . with intent to prevent
or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured . . . "
they are guilty of a felony. Hereafter this Act will be referred to as § 241.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
15. Compare note 1 with note 13, supra.
16. In Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887), it was held that the state and
federal phases of § 5519 were inseparable. The dissenting judge in the instant case
declared that it is impossible for a private person to deprive another of his rights;
that only state action could effectuate that result. Instant case at 315. This argu-
ment is purely semantic for, if the word "deprive" is capable of more than one
meaning, then the meaning which Congress contemplated must govern. Obviously
Congress did not intend such a narrow reading of §47(3). See notes 4 and 5
supra.
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remedy for one who has suffered a deprivation of his rights as a "citizen of
the United States," and the latter provisions are valid.
Prosecutions under § 241 over the course of years have determined
to some degree just what rights are federal rights, and hence, the boundaries
of that narrow area over which the National Government may extend its
jurisdiction to prevent infringement of the rights of others. The cases
brought under § 241 have usually involved either a right found necessary
for the proper functioning of the Federal Government, 17 or a right founded
upon a federal statute.'8 Section 47(3) has, meanwhile, lain dormant over
the years, and in the very few times when it has been before the courts,
while it has been assumed to be Constitutional, it has been held to vindicate
only such rights as exist under § 241 against persons acting with state
authority.19 In the instant case, the court finds § 47(3) to be effective
against private persons with no state authority. Further, the court adds
another to that slowly increasing list of federal rights which § 241 and
§ 47(3) protect, namely the right of citizens to assemble and petition Con-
gress for a redress of grievances.
20
Whether the Supreme Court, on review, will sustain this decision may
depend upon certain controversial, practical considerations. There has
been a visible trend for many years towards the extension of federal au-
thority into regions that were once considered the sole concern of the
states.21 In the field of civil rights protection, the need for such an exten-
sion continues to be great due to the danger of nullification of precious rights
by state process. 22  Also, upholding a civil remedy for the vindiction of
federal civil rights would probably have more significance than the threat of
a criminal prosecution. Besides the necessary selectivity exercised by prose-
cutors as to which cases to prosecute,2 there may be official reluctance to
17. E.g., Crandall v. Nevada, supra (right to travel to the seat of the Federal
Government, and to carry on business there) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, supra (right of
qualified voters to cast ballots in a federal election); Logan v. United States, 144
U.S. 263 (1892) (right to be free from violence while in the custody of a federal
marshal).
18. United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884) (right to enjoy the privileges
of the federal Homestead Act). But cf. Love v. Chandler, 124 F.2d 785 (8th Cir.
1942) (There is no federally guaranteed right to a W.P.A. job).
19. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914). In Love v. Chandler, supra, the
Court declared, by way of dictum, that § 47(3) gave a right of action only against
persons acting under state authority. The Tenth Circuit case of Viles v. Symes, 129
F.2d 828 (1942), placed a similar construction on § 47(3) and the Second Circuit
case of Bomar v. Bogart, 159 F.2d 338 (1947) mentioned with approval the Love
v. Chandler decision. Thus, the applicability of § 47(3) to private individuals has
been denied.
20. The court relied on dictum first found in the case of United States v. Cruik-
shank, supra, indicating that the right involved in the instant case is one that may
be federally protected by a § 241 prosecution. This dictum has been accepted in
many cases. Cf. Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 513 (1939); Powe v. United
States, 109 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1940).
21. Cf. Ex Porte Yarbrough, supra; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
Hague v. C. I. 0., supra; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
22. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 L. & C.P. 216, 230 (1948); Clark, A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil
Rights Statutes, 47 CoL. L. Rxv. 175, 185 (1947); "To Secure These Rights," Re-
port of President's Committee on Civil Rights, (1947).
23. Putzel, Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 439 (1950).
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prosecute.2 4  On the other hand, the Court may decide to draw the line
on this further extension of federal power because deleterious effects may
result from opening the federal courts, which have original jurisdiction over
these cases, to an onslaught of private damage suits. The Court may feel
that, rather than increase the burden of cases under which the federal courts
are struggling,25 it would be better to leave persons whose rights have been
violated by private individuals to their state remedies.26  Other problems
may arise in defining the extent of the rights encompassed by § 47(3),27
and in guarding against discouraging a local sense of responsibility for the
protection of civil rights. Yet after weighing these difficulties perhaps the
Court will agree with the majority opinion in this case, that, "If . . . the
load becomes too burdensome, it then becomes a matter with which the
Congress must deal." 28
Constitutional Law-Validity of a Statute Requiring Govern-
mental Approval of Private Trade School Tuition Rates-Petitioner,
the operator of a private beauty culture school, refused to discontinue
charging certain fees and to refund others already collected,1 although re-
quested to do so by the Commissioner of Education. Thereupon, the Com-
missioner, acting pursuant to Section 5001 of the New York Education
Law which requires his approval of tuition fees before issuance of a license
to operate a private trade school,2 refused to. renew petitioner's license for
1949-50. The Appellate Division held these provisions of the statute un-
constitutional on the grounds that since there was no "showing . . .that
tuition in trade schools is a matter of great public concern or affected
with a public interest . . .," 3 such a regulation was an unwarranted exer-
cise of the state's police power. Grow System School v. Board of Regents,
98 N. Y. Supp. 2d 834 (1950).
Undoubtedly the state's police power to regulate for the furtherance
of the general welfare includes some power to regulate private schools. In
conjunction with the power of the state to enact compulsory education
24. See Memorandum of Respondents in Reply to Petition to the Supreme Court
for Writ of Certiorari, p. 10.
25. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADmINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 44, 45, 46 (1949).
26. See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and
State Courts, 13 CORN. L.Q. 499 (1928).
27. See instant case at 319.
28. Instant case at 314.
1. The fees involved were for lockers, notebooks and various certificates. The
court concluded such charges were a part of tuition and that approving tuition was
the same as fixing any other prices. Instant case at 835.
2. To like effect is Section IX-3, Rules and Regulations of State Board of
Private Trade Schools, LAws, RULES, REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS OF INSTRUCTION
GOVERNING PRIVATE TRADE SCHOOLS, CLASSES, AND AGENTS 13 (1950), issued by the
Pennsylvania State Board of Private Trade Schools.
3. Instant case at 837.
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laws, it may also set academic standards and require certain subjects to
be taught.4 But whether the approval of tuition rates may also be re-
quired without violating due process5 presents a more difficult issue be-
cause that amounts to price legislation, always a more controversial exer-
cise of the police power than other forms of regulation.
Certain historic businesses, such as inns, cabs, and grist mills, as well
as "public utilities" have from an early date been subjected to govern-
mental price control.6 Aside from this limited group, businesses cannot be
formally classified as either proper or improper subjects of price regula-
tion. In early cases there appeared to be a presumption against the con-
stitutionality of such legislation; it was only upheld when conditions in
an industry providing a large segment of the population with an "indis-
pensable" product or service, were such that the supply was threatened or
the consumer exposed to exploitation. 7 Though this approach once allowed
laissez-faire indoctrinated courts to invalidate sorely needed legislation,8
the Supreme Court of the United States steadily shifted its position on
the function of the Court in reviewing price legislation. As a result state
regulation fixing minimum wages for women was permitted,
9 and in
Olsen v. Nebraska '0 the setting of maximum rates for employment agencies
was upheld, though both types of control had previously been declared
unconstitutional by the Court." In fact, in the latter case the Court
refused to consider the competitive condition of the market to determine
if a necessity for the legislation actually existed.12  Though it is unlikely
4. For a discussion of this subject and cases related thereto, see Note, New York
Law Affecting the Liberty of Parents and Private Schools to Direct the Education
of Children, 4 INTRA. L. REv. N.Y.U. 35 (1948-49); McLAUGHLIN, PRIVATE, ELE-
MENTARY, AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1946).
5. Freedom of contract has been the right which the courts were once most
eager to protect. But see Holmes, J. dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 75 (1905), "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics."
6. See Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535
(1923).
7. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (milk industry); German Alliance
Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914) (fire insurance); Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113 (1876) (grain elevators). See Hale, The Constitution and the Price
System: Somte Reflections on, Nebbia v. New York, 34 CoL. L. REv. 401 (1934).
8. Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (minimum wages for
women) ; Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (resale price of enter-
tainment tickets) ; Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (employment agency
rates).
9. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See Dumbauld,
Judicial Review and Popular Sovereignty, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 197, 201 (1950).
10. 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
11. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra (minimum wages for women); Ribnik
v. McBride, supra (employment agency rates).
12. Olsen v. Nebraska, supra at 246. In response to the contention that no cir-
cumstances were shown curbing competition between employment agencies, so that
setting maximum rates to prevent exploitation of their customers might be justified,
Mr. Justice Douglas replied: "We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom,
need, or appropriateness of the legislation. Differences of opinion on that score
suggest a choice which 'should be left where . . . it was left by the Constitution-
to the States and to Congress. . . .' There is no necessity for the State to demon-
strate before us that evils persist. . . ." See 40 MIcH. L. REV. 743 (1942). Though
the language of the court would not permit such an inference it has been suggested
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that the Court will in the future totally relinquish its right to inquire into
the merits of price regulation, it is significant that no regulation of prices
has been invalidated by the Court since depression conditions forced an
abandonment of the earlier laissez-faire approach.' 3 However, this modern
trend in the federal courts has not been recognized by all state courts, and
these are the final arbiters in determining whether state legislation is vio-
lative of the state constitution. But the result and approach in the Olsen
case have been relied on heavily by New York courts in sustaining legis-
lation limiting the resale price of entertainment tickets 14 -- and even though
a similar New York law had been held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of the United States some years earlier, at the time when it was
still committed to the idea that price fixing should be rigidly limited.15 In
the light of those decisions, it is surprising that the New York court of
the instant case reverted to the old restrictive test, declaring that the Com-
missioner lacked the power to approve tuition rates because there was no
"critical, abnormal, or quasi-criminal" 16 situation apparent.
Like the ticket scalpers law this price legislation was designed to
enable a large group to be protected from exorbitant charges.17 Further-
more, should business conditions change and the schools be not so much
in demand, it was thought that the Commissioner would be better able to
protect established institutions from the unfair price cutting competition
of fly-by-night schools, more interested in the profit involved than the
establishment of a permanent source of learning.' 8 Such legislation also
that a controlling factor causing the court to change its position regarding employ-
ment agencies was the increase in the number of unemployed from 2,000,000 in
1927 to 7,000,000 in 1940, so that a larger segment of the population was affected.
7 NAT. BAR J. 368, 370 (1949). See Smith Brothers Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. v.
People, 108 Colo. 449, 119 P.2d 623 (1941) (regulating prices of cleaning and dye-
ing establishments upheld, though reversed on other grounds).
13. See Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Dute Process in the States, 34
MINN. L. REv. 91, 92 (1950). See also Townsend v. Yeoman, 301 U.S. 441 (1937)
(price regulation of tobacco warehousemen upheld).
14. Kelly-Sullivan Inc. v. Moss, 174 N.Y. Misc. 1098, 22 N.Y.S. 2d 491
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 921, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 984 (1st Dept. 1940); 180
N.Y. Misc. 3, 39 N.Y. Supp. 2d. 797 (Sup. Ct. 1943). A similar statute was re-
cently declared unconstitutional in Kirtley v. State, 84 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. 1949), the
rationale of the court being much the same as in the instant case. See 7 NAT.
BAR J. 368 (1949).
15. Tyson & Brother v. Banton, supra.
16. Instant case at 836.
17. Approximately 30,000 students are enrolled in private trade schools in New
York state in an average year. 42d Annual Report of the Education Department
99, 4 N.Y. LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS (1946). See 43d Anntal Report of the Educa-
tion Departnwnt 178, 8 N.Y. LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS (1947); 38th Annual Report
of the Education Department 199, 14 N.Y. LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS (1942). In the
majority of cases the student could not obtain this training in the public school sys-
tem. 36th Annual Report of the Education Department 125, 3 N.Y. LEGISLATIVE
DOCUMENTS (1940). See 42d Annual Report of the Education Department 100,
4 N.Y. LEGISLATIVE DocuaENTS (1946) to the effect that 90 per cent of the students
in private trade schools are not eligible to enroll in public school classes.
18. 40th Annual Report of the Education Department 179, 5 N.Y. LEGISLATIVE
DOCUMENTS (1944) ; 39th Annutal Report of the Education Department 158, 11 N.Y.
LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS (1943) ; 38th Annual Report of the Education Department
199, 14 N.Y. LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS (1942). The more popular courses offered
by these schools include: aircraft and engine mechanics, barbering, beauty culture,
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provided an auxiliary means by which proper standards can be assured.
And finally it was a safeguard against possible unjustified price rises in
tuition rates designed to take advantage of government paid G. I. tuition.
But notwithstanding such benefits, the fear of the court that to uphold
this legislation would permit the state to fix the tuition of all educational
institutions, thus interfering with freedom of education, 19 led them to
revert to the restrictive rationale. However, it is difficult to see how ap-
proval of tuition rates impinges on the right of the individual to acquire
knowledge in those fields which he desires, which is the educational freedom
the courts have most jealously guarded.20 Nor does it seem that one as
familiar with the schools and their problems as the Commissioner, would
be incapable of carrying out his price fixing authority or be overburdened
by it. For its purpose is essentially to correct individual abuses, and
there is no need for that vast statistical and economic knowledge which a
regulatory agency needs to fix the rates of a major industry. It is to be
hoped that the feeling that government regulation of private school educa-
tion should be minimized was the determining factor in this decision, and
that the court will not in the future consider itself bound by a test, the
application of which has been seen to impair many desirable legislative
programs.
Criminal Procedure-Contempt of Court-Duration of Judge's
Power to Punish Summarily-Appellants were counsel for the defend-
ants in the "Communist Trial." During the course of the trial Judge
Medina frequently warned them that he considered their conduct con-
temptuous. After the verdict in the main case, the judge summarily found
all of the appellants in contempt for acts which were committed at times
varying from nine months to ten days prior to their adjudication as con-
temptuous. In affirming the convictions, the circuit court held that the
judge was not required to take immediate action on the commission of
the contempts, but had power after the verdict was rendered to punish
them summarily. United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950).
The power of a court to punish contempts without formal notice,
hearing, trial, or any other process,' is a striking but ancient 2 departure
commercial art, dental mechanics, diesel engine mechanics, dressmaking, drafting,
photography, plastics, radio, refrigeration, and watchmaking. 43d Annual Report of
the Education Department 181, 8 N.Y. LEGIsLATIvE DOCUMENTS (1947). As can
be seen there are included in this group trades which are most essential to the in-
duitrial efforts of the country.
19. Instant case at 837.
20. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (compulsory attendance
at public schools unconstitutional); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (pro-
hibition on teaching foreign language unconstitutional). See note 3 supra.
1. E.g., Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 287 (1888); Cooke v. U.S., 267 U.S. 517
(1925).
2. The power dates back at least to the time of Henry V and perhaps even
earlier. See the discussion of the problem in Fox, The History of Contempt of
Court ix, 50-2, 53, 55 (1st ed. 1927).
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from normal Anglo-Saxon criminal procedures; and is founded on the
belief that judges must have this power to punish indignities, so that court-
room trials won't assume the character of street-brawls.3 Indeed, the
contempt power is usually thought to be "inherent in the nature of the
court." 4  But because its exercise deprives a citizen of liberty and prop-
erty, without any semblance of due process, both congress and the courts
have sought to limit it to "the least possible power adequate to the end." 5
Neither, however, has decisively answered the question of how long after
the act of contempt the summary power to punish it exists.6 From pre-
vious cases there can be distilled two conflicting answers to the problem of
the time issue. According to one, the power to punish contempts sum-
marily is given to a judge solely for the narrow purpose of keeping control
of his court by visiting immediate punishment on any conduct which
threatens to demoralize it.7 The emergency begets the power and since
the function of the power is preventive rather than retributive, the power
lasts only so long as the emergency.8 Once the emergency is over, the
judge must confine his action to instituting formal contempt proceedings
against the offender, necessitating a full hearing before another judge.9
3. Ex parte Terry, supra note 1. It is interesting to note that the same fore-
bodings of collapse were used by the court in sustaining Congress' power to punish
contempts summarily, in Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (1821). A later court
thought, correctly as it seems now, that congress could do without it. Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, (1880). For a brilliant attack on the assumption that
any summary punishment power is necessary to protect the courts, see, I Livingston,
Works 258-266 (1st ed. 1873).
4. E.g., Ex Parte Terry, supra note 1; Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949).
See also, Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 CoL.
L. REv. 401 (1928); Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure
in Criminal Contempts In "Inferior Federal Courts," 37 HARv. L. REv. 1010 (1924).
5. Anderson v. Dunn, s1pra note 3, at 230. As a result of the abuse of the
broad summary power vested in the courts by the Act of 1789, Congress in 1831
amended it to restrict summary punishment virtually to cases of contempts com-
mitted in the face of the court. 18 U.S.C. §401 (1948). This act has received
a generally narrow interpretation by the courts. E.g. Nye v. U.S., 313 U.S. 33
(1941).
6. This problem was expressly left open in Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 314
(1888) and again in Pendergast v. U.S., 317 U.S. 412, 419 (1942). The Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure under which the trial Judge proceeded in the instant
case simply provides "a criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the
Judge . . . saw . . . (it) . . . and . . . it was committed in the actual pres-
ence of the court. . . ." 18 U.S.C.A. Rule 42(a) (Supp. 1949).
7. The clearest expression of this view is in Justice Holmes' dissent in Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. U.S., 247 U.S. 402, 423 (1888). See also. Cooke v. U.S., 267
U.S. 517, 534, 536, (1925) ; In Re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945) ; In Re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 275, 276, 278 (1947).
8. Thus in the instant case, when the judge summarily sentenced one of the
defendants for refusing to answer a question on the stand, and three others for
creating a near-riot, his action would be defensible on this theory. See U.S. v. Gates,
176 F.2d 78 (2d. Cir. 1949) ; U.S. v. Green, 176 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1949) ; U.S., v.
Hall and Winston 176 F.2d, 163 (2d Cir. 1949).
9. Authority for these proceedings is to be found in Rule 42(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides "A criminal contempt except as pro-
vided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall
state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation
of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the contempt ...
If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is
disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing...." 18 U.S.C.A. Rule 42(b)
(Supp. 1949).
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According to the second view, the function of the summary power can not
be confined within the narrow limits of deterring contemptuous conduct
in the immediate case, but must also deter like contempts in future cases.10
Hence it makes little difference whether punishment is imposed at the crisis
of contempt or deferred until a more convenient time, so long as the in-
terval between the act and its punishment is not too unreasonable. In
affirming the summary convictions of these appellants, the court in the
instant case has adopted the second view of the function of the summary
power, thus permitting courts to punish previous contempts at the ter-
mination of the trial.
The time problem only arises when the judge has foregone immediate
action and later uses his summary power to punish acts which were not
previously decided to be contemptuous. In such cases the summary method
can not be justified on the ground that immediate action was necessary
to prevent the demoralization of the court because the contempt is past
and the danger over before action is taken. The only justification for such
summary action is that it will deter future contempts. But since any
arbitrary power must be confined within the narrowest limits "adequate
to the end," it is not enough to show that such summary action would be
a convenient method of deterring contempts; it must be the only method
to deter such contempts. To sustain this view, the majority advances
three basic arguments: 1) Summary punishment can not be used pre-
ventively ,in the self-defense, since by definition the contempt must have
occurred before punishment is imposed. Hence the power must be de-
signed primarily to deter contempts in future cases 11 and punishment
need not immediately follow the act. 2) If the judge had no power to
postpone summary action until after the trial is over, he would either
have to abandon all efforts to keep order during the trial, or assume the
risk of causing a mistrial by unduly prejudicing the jury.12 3) If delayed
summary action is not upheld in this case, the result might well encourage
similar conduct in future cases.' 3 The first argument ignores the fact that
although summary punishment can never prevent the very act which is
punished, it can, by nipping contemptuous conduct in the bud, prevent
more serious disturbances on the part of the contemnor or his sympathizers.
The second argument disregards the fact that prejudicing the jury can be
avoided simply by excusing them when punishment is imposed, as was
done in the instant case when defendants Hill, Gates, Winston and Green
were punished for contempt.' 4 The third argument assumes more obvi-
ously than the preceding ones that if these contempts are not punished
10. The facts in Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888) tend to support this
view. (See instant case at 457). Terry had fled the court he had disrupted and
hence the emergency was over at the time punishment was imposed. See also In re
Maury, 205 Fed. 626 (9th Cir. 1913) where a delay of 24 hours was not held
fatal to summary jurisdiction.
11. Instant case at 429, 458.
12. Instant case at 429, 459.
13. Instant case at 429, 454.
14. See note 8, mtpra.
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summarily, they will not be punished at all. This assumption overlooks
the fact that even if the judge's summary power is limited to immediate
action at the crisis of contempt, he still retains the power to cite past con-
tempt for later punishment by other authorities. 15
None of the above arguments answer the basic question of why a
judge should be permitted to use this extraordinary power at a time when
it is clearly not necessary to prevent the demoralization of his court, and-
when the same results-punishment of the offenders-can be achieved by
other means which do not sacrifice the values of due process. If the
necessity for such a use of the summary power is not apparent, the dangers
from its abuse are obvious. By not requiring a judge to act promptly if
he is going to punish summarily, the narrow holding of the majority would
permit a judge to scrutinize the record after a trial is over for incidents
which could conceivably be construed as contemptuous and then suddenly
visit summary punishment on the head of surprised counsel.16 The danger,
of this kind of abuse is heightened by the fact that the substantive elements
of the contempt-the insulting tone, the provocative gesture-are matters
which do not usually appear on the record and on which appellate courts
usually take the word of the offended judge.17 The danger that this case
will be cited as a precedent for that kind of action may be lessened by the
fact that its unique facts-the number of defendants, the amazing length
of the trial, the political aspect of the issues involved-make it easily dis-
tinguishable from the ordinary trial. But it is in just such a case as this
that the personality of the judge is likely to be under the severest strain
and the temptation to arbitrary action the greatest. For this reason the
instant court has approved an extension of arbitrary power which is
neither doctrinally nor practically necessary, and which is open to dan-
gerous abuse.
Federal Jurisdiction-Lack of Federal Question in Claim for Dam-
ages. in Trespass Resulting from Violation of Federal Housing and
Rent Act-The federal Housing and Rent Act ' prohibits eviction of
a tenant living in controlled housing accommodations unless among other
15. See note 9, supra.
16. Though Judge Medina usually warned counsel when he thought a particular
remark was contemptuous, the warnings were in no sense made a necessary part of
the majority's holding, and some of the remarks later certified as contempt were
not said to be so at the time they were spoken. Indeed the record leaves one in
doubt as to whether or not Judge Medina himself thought some of them contemptuous
at the time they were spoken, though he later certified them as being contempt.
See instant case at 432 and 436.
17. For a classic case of the court accepting the word of the offended judge
see Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949). It should also be noted that it is not
impossible for a judge to read contempt into the record when none is in fact there.
The defendants in the instant case felt that Judge Medina was doing this at times.
See instant case at 433.
1. 61 STAT. 200 (1947), as amended, 62 STAT. 98 (1948), 63 STAT. 29 (1949),
50 U.S.C. App. § 1899 (Supp. 1950). Plaintiff sued under the 1948 Amendment to
the Act. The Act in present form differs materially as a result of the 1949 Amend-
ment.
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things the landlord requires the premises for his own use. Timely notice
by landlord to that effect obliges tenant to remove or face eviction pro-
ceedings. Plaintiffs, former tenants in controlled housing, filed a complaint
in the federal district court 2 alleging a disadvantageous removal as the
result of defendant landlord's fraudulent notice and claiming trespass dam-
ages. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction since the
pertinent section of the Rent Act gave plaintiffs no right of action and there
was no necessity for determining "the validity, construction or effect of the
Act." Crawford v. Pituch, 91 F. Supp. 626 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
There is no effective rule of thumb for determining whether a matter
in controversy so "arises under the . . . laws . . . of the United States"
as to pose a federal question within the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts.3 Criteria presently in vogue are no more than a license to the
courts to indulge in line drawing: Plaintiff's right of action must be cre-
ated by a federal law,4 and/or his right must be such as will be defeated
by one construction of the law or sustained by another.5 Perpetuation of
these criteria has taken the form of oft repeated glosses. Either a deter-
mination of "the validity, construction or effect" or "a construction or
application" of a federal law is prerequisite to jurisdiction. 6 Yet, in spite
of these well worn phrases and their implication of twofold criteria, a
definite single pattern is discernible in court practice. Jurisdiction is
unhesitatingly found where plaintiff's cause is built directly upon a federal
statute as opposed to state law to which federal legislation may be collateral
or enabling. Thus jurisdiction is taken over a patent case which merely
requires application of undisputed law to facts. 7 But not even a strong
likelihood of construction of relevant federal legislation will save jurisdic-
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1950). "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
3. See, e.g., Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial
Code, 13 LAw & CoNTvmp. PROB. 216 (1948); Chadbourn and Levin, Original Juris-
diction of Federal Questions, 90 U. oF PA. L. REv. 639 (1942); Forrester, The
Nature of a "Federal Question", 16 TULANE L. REv. 362 (1942).
4. See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936); Puerto Rico
v. Russel & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933); Smith v. Kansas City Title Co., 255
U.S. 180, 214, 215 (1921) (dissent by Justice Holmes); McGoon v. Northern Pac.
Ry. Co., 204 Fed. 998, 1004 (D.N.D. 1913).
5. See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat. Bank, supra at 112 (1936); Gold-Washing &
Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203 (1877); Taylor v. Smith, 167 F.2d 797, 798
(7th Cir. 1948); Regents of New Mexico v. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co.. 158
F.2d 900, 907 (10th Cir. 1947); Allen v. Clark, 22 F. Supp. 898, 900 (S.D. Cal.
1938). It should be noted that the genesis of this criterion is found in a case where
it was obiter dictum. Repetition in subsequent cases never amounted to anything
more. See Chadbourn and Levin, supra note 3, at 650.
6. Numerous opinions voice one or the other gloss, e.g., Shulthis v. McDougal,
225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912) ; Miller v. Long, 152 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1945) ; Miller
v. City of Greenville, 138 F.2d 712, 718 (8th Cir. 1943).
7. The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913). Nor is jurisdiction of cases
involving only application of law to facts peculiar to patent cases. See Fields v.
Washington, 173 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1949) (action for treble damages authorized
by § 205 of the Housing and Rent Act).
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tion over a case founded in common law contracts or ejectment.9  Re-
peated examination by the courts of the nature 10 of plaintiff's right rather
than its ultimate origin,'. before granting jurisdiction, confirms a single
rule in practice despite the double-barreled dicta. A plaintiff seeking
relief in a federal court of first instance must come prepared to show that
he is there to vindicate a right of property or action granted immediately
by federal law. 12  That ultimately in the case a construction of federal
law may be involved is immaterial.' 3 In refusing jurisdiction in the present
case the court followed the single rule in practice. The claim of damages
in trespass was available only by operation of the state substantive law.
The Rent Act did not provide for it.' 4 In demonstrating that "the validity,
construction or effect" of the Rent Act was not involved the court showed
deference to cumulative misleading dicta putatively granting jurisdiction
if construction of federal law were foreshadowed.
The criterion of nature of the plaintiff's right which seems to be fol-
lowed by the courts in practice might not be conveniently adaptable to
rigid statutory formulation. 15 It may limit the discretion of the courts to
draw to themselves cases where a federal vindication of federal rights is
required. This assumes bias or inadequacy of state courts.' 6  On the
other hand the fluid rule to which the courts presently give dicta deference
8. Gully v. First Nat. Bank, supra, (claim in contract based on obligation in-
curred as result of state tax on national banks "enabled" by federal legislation);
Barnhart v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 128 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1942) (claim for
damages for breach of contract between employer and employees entered into under
the federal Railway Labor Act).
9. Shosone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900) ("adverse suit" author-
ized by federal law to determine disposition of mineral lands, subject of a federal
patent) and cases cited.
10. Puerto Rico v. Russel & Co., supra at 483. "The federal nature of the
right to be established is decisive-not the source of the authority to establish it."
(Italics supplied.) To the same effect, Gully v. First Nat. Bank, supra at 116.
11. Shulthis v. McDougal, supra at 569. "A suit to enforce a right which takes
its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone,
one arising under those laws. . . ." (Italics supplied.) To the same effect, Ship-
ley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 70 F. Supp. 870, 878 (W.D. Pa. 1947); Regents of
New Mexico v. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., supra at 907.
12. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 225. A few courts have determined jurisdiction
solely on the nature of the federal right without recourse to superfluous dicta. Such
course is commendable. See, e.g., Leidy v. Connor, 70 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
13. See note 5, supra.
14. An interesting problem arises when the instant case is examined in the light
of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). In the Bell case, the Supreme Court, reversing
decisions in the lower federal courts, found jurisdiction where plaintiff sought dam-
ages for violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments (search and
seizure clauses). Plaintiff there claimed that the constitutional guaranties gave him
ipso facto a right to damages for infraction. That is another thing than saying viola-
tion of a federal right gives a claim for damages in trespass. For an authoritative dis-
cussion of the potentialities of the Bell case see MOORE, COMENTARY ON THE U.S.
JUDICIAL CODE 144 (1949).
15. Pending enactment of title 28 of the U.S. Code into law, one noted authority
recommended statutory limitation of federal question jurisdiction. He suggested that
28 U.S.C. § 1331, supra note 2 be revised to limit the scope of such jurisdiction "to
cases where the plaintiff's claim for relief is founded on the Constitution, laws or
treaties." Wechsler, supra note 3, at 225.
16. Forrester, supra note 3, at 385.
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poses no less serious inconveniences. A lawyer willing to waste the time
and money of his client on a jurisdictional gamble may foist off on already
overcrowded federal dockets cases that have no right to be there. If
jurisdiction is loosely assumed, a decision on the merits after prolonged
litigation may be struck down upon finding on appeal that there was no
warrant for jurisdiction in the first place.17 Available remedy in the state
courts upon dismissal of the complaint may save the litigant his right.'
8
But the danger of cluttering federal dockets with claims which do not
belong there is, in this day of growing federal legislation, a high price to
pay for the enlarged discretion that equivocal jurisdictional criteria afford.'0
Fire Insurance-Standard Mortgagee Clause-Mortgagee Not
Bound by Appraisal Conducted Without His Knowledge or Consent-
The owner of certain premises damaged by fire entered into an appraisal
proceeding with the insurance company under the terms of a standard fire
policy ' covering the premises. An award was formulated. The mortgagee
named in the standard mortgagee clause attached to the policy sued the
company. The company contended that the appraisal award was binding
on the mortgagee. Reversing the appellate division, the court held that a
mortgagee named in a standard mortgage clause is not bound by an appraisal
of loss conducted by the owner and insurer without the mortgagee's par-
tcipation in the selection of the appraiser or formulation of the award even
though the owner is bound by the award. Syracuse Savings Bank v. York-
shire Insurance Co., 301 N.Y. 403, 94 N.E.2d 73 (1950).
Under the open loss payable clause 2 (now obsolete) the mortgagee
was regarded as a mere appointee of the mortgagor. Thus, in general, the
mortgagee was bound by acts or neglects of the mortgagor, which although
17. See Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 81 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1936). In this case
jurisdiction was assumed by the District Court and the decision on the merits was
upheld in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Ground for jurisdiction was a potential
construction of federal law. Rejecting this basis of jurisdiction the Supreme Court
on appeal dismissed the complaint. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
18. Remedy in the state courts is available provided complainant has not used
up the statute of limitations in his federal court litigation. In addition there is the
waste of expense and time involved in an unsuccessful try at the federal courts.
19. There has been a steadily increasing number of pending cases on federal dis-
trict court dockets since the war. This indicates a losing battle on the part of the
courts to keep apace of the cases which come before them as a result in part of
expanding federal legislation. Records show that 54,240 cases were pending in 1949,
almost twice the mimber pending in pre-war years. The- upswing of pending cases
has not been stopped. It is still a rising curve. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs, Charts
6, 8 and 9 (1949). Unequivocal formulae would tend to reduce the incidence of
cases remanded or dismissed. ANNUAL REPORT supra, Table C4.
1. N.Y. Insurance Law 27, § 168 (McKinney, 1949).
2. ". . . loss, if any, is payable (naming mortgagee) as his interest shall
appear."
RECENT CASES
beyond the mortgagee's control, might avoid the original policy.$ To re-
move this impairment to the mortgagee's interest, the standard or union
mortgagee clause provides "this insurance as to the interest of the mortgagee
only shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or
owner. . .. " 4 To give effect to the obvious change intended by the use
of this provision, the courts developed a theory that this clause created a
"separate contract" of insurance of the mortgagee's interest in the insured
property.6 By applying the "separate contract" theory the courts held the
following acts or neglects of the mortgagor did not defeat the mortgagee's
interest in the property: setting fire to the property,8 attempting to cancel
the policy,7 making the risk more hazardous contrary to the policy,s failure
to render proof of loss as required by the policy,9 and an adjustment of
the loss by the mortgagor and the insurance company the manner of which
was not within the terms of the policy.10 On the precise issue presented
in the instant case-whether a named mortgagee in a standard or union
mortgagee clause is bound by an appraisal conducted under the terms of the
policy "-the courts are split.' 2  The instant court, relying heavily on the
3. Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 65 F. 165 (8th Cir. 1894). Most courts held
that the mortgagee was bound by an appraisal and award proceeding between the
insurance company and the mortgagor. E.g., Collingsville Savings Soc. v. Boston
Ins. Co., 77 Conn. 676, 60 Atl. 647 (1905) ; Orenstein v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 131
S.C. 500, 127 S.E. 570 (1925); Chandos v. American Fire Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 184
(1893). Contra, Bergman v. Ins. Co., 92 Ky. 494, 18 S.W. 122 (1892); Georgia
Home Ins. Co. v. Stein, 72 Miss. 943, 18 So. 414 (1895).
4. For a specimen of the standard mortgagee clause and a discussion of the dis-
tinction between the open and modern mortgagee clause see Bankers' Joint Stock
Land Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co, 158 Minn. 363, 197 N.W. 749 (1924)
and 14 R.C.L. p. 215, p. 1037 (1916).
5. Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 65 F. 165 (8th Cir. 1894); Savarese v. Ohio
Farmers Ins. Co., 260 N.Y. 45, 182 N.E. 665 (1932) ; See Notes, 14 R.C.L. p. 215,
p. 1037-38 (1916); 25 L.R.A. 1226 (1910) ; Comment, 11 Wis. L. REv. 100 (1935).
6. H. F. Shepherdson Co. v. Central Fire Ins. Co., 220 Minn. 401, 19 N.W. 2d
772 (1945).
7. Gilman v. Comm. Ins. Co., 112 Me. 528, 92 Atl. 721 (1914).
8. Reinhardt v. Security Ins. Co., 321 Ill. App. 324, 53 N.E. 2d 13 (1944).
9. McDowell v. St. Paul Fire & Marirre Ins. Co., 207 N.Y. 482, 101 N.E. 457
(1913).
10. E.g., Scottish Union & National Ins. Co. v. Field, 18 Colo. App. 68, 70 Pac.
149 (1902); First National Bank v. Nat'l. Liberty Ins. Co., 156 Minn. 1, 194
N.W. 6 (1923) ; Hathaway v. Orient Ins. Co., 134 N.Y. 409, 32 N.E. 40 (1892).
11. "In case the insured and this company shall fail to agree as to the actual
cash value or the amount of loss, then, on the written demand of either, each shall
select a competent and disinterested appraiser selected within twenty days of such
demand The appraisers shall first select a competent and disinterested umpire; and
failing for fifteen days to agree upon such umpire, then, on request of the insured
or this Company, such umpire shall be selected by a judge of a court of record in
the state in which the property covered is located. The appraisers shall then appraise
the loss, stating separately actual cash value and loss to each item; and, failing to
agree, shall submit their differences, only, to the umpire. An award in writing, so
itemized, of any two when filed with this Company shall determine the amount of
actual cash value and loss . . ." N.Y. INsuRtANc LAw 27, § 168 (McKinney, 1949).
12. Holding mortgagee not bound by appraisal and award conducted under terms
of the policy. Reeder v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 805 (S.D. Fla. 1933) ;
Beaver Falls B. & L. Ass'n. v. Allemania Ins. Co., 305 Pa. 290, 157 Atl. 616 (1931).
Holding mortgagee bound by appraisal and award conducted under terms of the
policy. Dragon v. Automobile Ins. Co., 265 Mass. 440, 164 N.E. 383 (1929) ; Erie
Brewing Co. v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 81 Ohio St. 1, 89 N.E. 1065 (1909). See
Deruy Motor Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 146 Kan. 233, 69 P.2d 677 (1937).
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"separate contract" theory and a Pennsylvania case,13 declares that an
appraisal of fire damage conducted under the terms of the policy is an act
or neglect of the mortgagor which is not binding on the mortgagee because
it would impair his "separate interest" in the property.
The terms of the mortgagee's "separate contract" are the terms and
conditions of the policy itself excepting those which are repugnant to the
mortgagee's right to remain secure in the full coverage of the policy.14 The
acts or neglects of the mortgagor which do not bind the mortgagee are those
which would deny him full coverage of the policy or an act which would
create a defense under the policy.15 The act of appointing an appraiser falls
into neither of these categories; on the contrary, it protects the mortgagee's
recovery by assuring a fair determination, under the terms of the policy, of
the compensable loss. Moreover, there is no policy provision which
specifically gives the mortgagee a right to participate in the appraisal.
Despite these persuasive considerations the court's dogged determination to
protect the "separate interest" of the mortgagee led it to reject this ap-
proach to the case notwithstanding the confusion, hardship, and injustice
which its decision will promote. Under this decision, the mortgagee may
legally refuse to assent to appraisal proceedings. If the mortgagee is able
to secure a higher award (e.g., $12,000) than the mortgagor secured
under the appraisal provision of the policy 16 (e.g., $10,000), the ques-
tion arises whether the insurer can recover the "overpayment" (i.e., the
$2000) from the mortgagor. The theory for the insurer's recovery would
be that the mortgagor has "paid" only $10,000 on the mortgage but
has received a credit of $12,000; consequently the insurer would be entitled
to restitution of the involuntary benefit conferred upon the mortgagor. Prob-
ably the company will not be entitled to recover the "overpayment", and
as a result the mortgagor will receive, in effect, a higher award than he was
entitled to under his contract of insurance because of the consequent reduc-
tion of the mortgagee's equity. Furthermore, what procedure will be fol-
lowed and what consequences will ensue if two or more mortgagees refuse
to agree among themselves and the mortgagor as to a method of appraisal
present almost insoluble problems. In fact, insurance companies in Penn-
sylvania, which have operated under the rule of the instant case for twenty
13. Beaver Falls B. & L. Assn. v. Allemania Fire Ins. Co. supra note 12
(Facts and holding same as instant case).
14. E.g., Eddy v. London Assurance Corp., 143 N.Y. 311, 324, 38 N.E. 307, 310
(1894) ; Miners Savings Bank v. Merchants Fire Ins. Co., 131 Pa. Super. 21, 198
Atl. 495 (1938) (mortgagee bound by provision in policy limiting time within which
an action on the policy may be commenced).
15. Cases cited notes 6 to 10 supra.
16. Under the decision, if the mortgagee does not consent to a policy appraisal
he must secure his award either by jury verdict or settlement with the company.
A differential between the mortgagee's recovery and recovery under the policy is a
very real possibility because the mortgagee's claim is based on the contention that
the policy appraisal award is lower than it should rightly be. If the case is tried
in court, the award will probably be higher because of the jury's desire to redis-
tribute the wealth of the United States when an insurance company is the defend-
ant. For this reason, and others, insurance companies are willing to settle a claim
at a higher figure than the appraisal figure. This situation is exactly what the
appraisal clause was designed to prevent. See note 19 infra.
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years, constantly risk a jury determination of the loss award rather than
enter into a policy appraisal without the consent of the mortgagee.1 7 How-
ever, companies located in jurisdictions which hold that the insurance com-
pany must enter into appraisal proceedings 18 could not avoid the unfor-
tunate consequences of the decision by the Pennsylvania procedure.
No matter what procedure is followed, the instant decision, by giving
the mortgagee the power to force the company to risk, voluntarily or in-
voluntarily, a jury determination of the award, avoids the avowed purpose
of the appraisal provision, i.e., to make possible a speedy, just and inexpen-
sive adjustment of the most prolific cause of disputes among the parties to
an insurance contract.'9 The interest of the mortgagee will, in few cases,
20
if any, be harmed by holding him bound to a policy appraisal because in the
vast majority of cases the mortgagor is interested in securing the highest
award possible--whether or not the entire amount will be paid directly to
the mortgagee; and, the appraisal clause itself protects the mortgagee by
providing that the appraisal shall be conducted not by the mortgagor but by
a "competent and disinterested" third party. The dilemma presented by
the instant case can be solved by a legislative revision of the standard fire
policy making it specifically provide for participation by the mortgagee in
the initial appraisal on an equitable basis with the mortgagor and the insur-
ance company. However, since the policy which was construed is the one
in general use today, the instant court can be criticized for failing to recog-
nize and apply the principle that blind adherence to the "separate contract"
theory is improper and its use must be limited or circumvented when its
application entails adverse repercussions which outweigh the benefits derived
from its application.
21
Husband and Wife-Torts-Recognition of Wife's Cause of Ac-
tion for Loss of Consortium Caused by Negligent Injury to Husband-
After her husband had received compensation for injuries received while in
defendant's employ, plaintiff brought action for deprivation of consortium,
17. It is possible to follow this practice in Pennsylvania because the courts
hold that the appraisal provision of the policy is not binding on the parties. Gratz
v. Ins. Co. of North America, 282 Pa. 224, 127 At. 620 (1925).
18. E.g., Ex parte Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 233 Ala. 370, 172 So. 99 (1937) ;
Johns v. Security Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 125, 174 S.E. 215 (1934).
19. Kavlie v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 360, 288 N.W. 723 (1939);
Huebner, PROPERTY INsURANcE 200 (Rev. ed. 1938); Kristeller, An Analysis of
Appraisal Clause of Standard Fire Insurance Policy, in Section of Insurance Law,
AmERIcAN BAR Ass'N. 68 (1934-35) ; See notes 11 and 16 supra.
20. A case which might arise is one where the mortgagor is not the real
party in interest, i. e., the mortgage is as large as the depreciated market value of
the property and the mortgagor is financially irresponsible.
21. E.g., Erie Brewing Co. v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. supra; Savarese v. Ohio
Farmers Ins. Co., 260 N.Y. 45, 57, 182 N.E. 665, 668 (1932) (held that the mort-
gagor's acts of reducing the amount of insurance on the mortgaged property was
binding on the mortgagee in that the mortgagee had to accept a proportionally
smaller award); Imperial B. & L. Assoc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 113 W. Va. 62, 166
S.E. 841 (1932) ("separate contract" theory not applied where insured has no
insurable interest in the premises.)
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specifically loss of sexual relations, as a result of the injury. Summary
judgment was granted the defendant on the ground that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action. The appellate court reversed, holding that a wife
has a cause of action for loss of consortium resulting from negligent injury
to her husband.' Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).2
Consortium is the sum of those expectations growing out of the marital
relationship to which each spouse is entitled,8 such as companionship,
society, assistance, comfort, and affection.4  Loss of any or all of these is
termed loss of consortium.5 Absent statutory restrictions, an action will lie
on behalf of a husband suffering such loss as a result of a direct, intentional
wrong to the marital relationship,6 a common instance being alienation of
affections. 7 Likewise, in most jurisdictions, the husband may recover for
any physical injury to the wife, whether intentional 8 or negligent,9 which
results in a deprivation of the enjoyment of consortium. Since removal
of common law disabilities by the Married Woman's Acts, courts have only
recognized a cause of action in the wife for a direct, wilful invasion of the
marital relationship.10 In the event of physical injury to the husband result-
ing in loss of consortium, the wife has, until the instant decision, consistently
been denied a cause of action, even though the husband is entitled to
recovery in the converse situation."
Varied reasons have been put forward for denial of recovery in cases
such as the present. Most of the arguments stem from an artificial concept
of consortium which regards loss of material services as the only truly
1. The court also held that § 905 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1424 et seq. (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1946),
providing that ". . . liability of an employer . . . shall be exclusive and in place
of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, hus-
band or wife . . . ," could not bar this separate cause of action belonging to the
wife.
2. Certiorari denied, October 16, 1950, 19 U.S.L. WEaK 3106.
3. See Reppert v. Reppert, 40 Del. 492, 494, 13 A.2d 205 (Super Ct. 1940).
4. The words used to describe the elements of consortium vary from case to
case. For typical examples see Ramsey v. Ramsey, 34 Del. 576, 578, 156 Atl. 354,
355 (Super. Ct. 1931); Woodson v. Bailey, 210 Ala. 568, 570, 98 So. 809, 810
(1924).
5. Woodson v. Bailey, 210 Ala. 568, 98 So. 809 (1924).
6. See Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 105, 112 N.E. 204, 205
(1915).
7. Note that in many states actions for alienation of affections have been abolished
on grounds of public policy; e.g., New York, L. 1935, c. 263, N.Y. Civ. PPAc. AcT
§§ 61a-61i (Thompson 1939) ; Pennsylvania, 1935, June 22, P.L. 450, § 1, as amended
1937, June 25, P.L. 2317, § 1, 48 P.S. § 170 (Supp. 1949).
8. See Boer v. Hepfinger, 152 Wis. 558, 559, 140 N.W. 345, 346 (1913) ; see
PROSSER, TORTS 939-40 (1941).
9. Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947); Louisville & N.R. Co.
v. Kinman, 182 Ky. 597, 206 S.W. 880 (1918); see RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 693
(1938). A minority view, denying any recovery to the husband is expressed in
Marri v. Stamford St. R. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911).
10. See Root v. Root, 31 F. Supp. 562, 564 (N.D. Cal. 1940).
11. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 695 (1938); PROSSER, TORTS 948 (1941). Only
one previous case recognized the wife's cause of action, Hipp v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9. 108 S.E. 318 (1921); and that was effectively over-
ruled in Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
In a recent decision a Georgia court was equally divided on the subject, McDade v.
West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 299 (1949).
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compensable element in the case of injury to the spouse.12 From this it is
reasoned that full recovery is had by the husband in his action for personal
injuries, and any damages allowed to the wife would be double recovery.' 3
Such reasoning fails to recognize the accepted nature of consortium, a com-
posite of marital rights, interference with any part of which is interference
with the marriage itself. The injury is to the wife and therefore can never
be compensated in the husband's action; with careful assessment of damages
so as to avoid material services there need be no fear of double recovery.
Courts have also denied recovery on the ground that the wife had no right
of action at common law, nor did the enabling statutes give her a new
one.' 4 Yet statutes were not relied on when the courts extended a right of
recovery to the wife for wilful invasions of the marriage; the common law
was flexible enough to provide a remedy where the courts thought it was
needed. A similar objection, that this is a region which the law will not
enter except of necessity, 15 also fails in view of the extent to which the law
has provided remedies in other instances of loss of consortium. Perhaps
the strongest argument against recovery is the remoteness of the injury
from the standpoint of the wrongdoer's duty,'0 yet this has not deterred
courts from granting relief to the husband where the wife suffered the
physical injury. If the law is to protect consortium in any instance, modern
ideas of the equality of the parties in the marital relationship, as recognized
by the instant court, call for the same equality in event of injury to a
spouse as that recognized in the case of direct invasion of the relationship.
The damage suffered by the wife through loss of consortium lies in a
region which may be termed psychic loss,' 7 involving impairment of the
capacity to enjoy life, as opposed to economic damage. In granting legal
recognition to such injury, the instant case therefore raises difficult prob-
lems concerning the determination of damages. Because of the absence of
any predetermined mathematical basis, the common sense and judgment
of court and jury must 'be relied upon to arrive at reasonable compensation.
Certainly the full economic impact of the instant case must await the deter-
mination of the precise pecuniary value of this psychic injury, but it is at
least clear that employers and others subject to frequent actions for negligent
injuries will have to consider additional protection by way of insurance, with
a resultant effect on their rates. Courts which follow the present case will
also have to face the question of whether the husband's contributory negli-
12. E.g., Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
See a discussion of this fiction in Lippman, The Breakdwm of Consortium, 30
COL. L. REv. 651, 666-8 (1930).
13. Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937);
Feneff v. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).
14. Nash v. Mobile & O.R.Co., 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100 (1928); Tobiassen
v. Polley, 96 N.J.L. 66, 114 Atl. 153 (1921).
15. Stout v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019
(1913); Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912).
16. Feneff v. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436
(1909).
17. See Smith, Psychic Interest in Continua ion of One's Own Life: Legal
Recognition and Protectim, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 781, 796-803 (1950).
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gence will bar the wife's recovery-bearing in mind that her cause of action
is logically entirely separate from that of the husband for his injuries. In
cases where the physical injury was to the wife, it has been held that her
contributory negligence is a defense to the husband's action,' 8 a rule which
has been criticized because of the separate nature of the actions.' 9 To
summarize: what the instant court has done is to grant legal recognition
and protection to a new interest, and to raise difficult problems which may
be solved only as this new field of law suits is more fully explored.
Inheritance and Gift Tax-Estate Taxation of Survivorship In-
terest in Annuity Purchased by Decedent's Employer-Under an an-
nuity contract purchased by his employer as part of a group pension plan,
decedent was entitled to receive upon his retirement either a stipulated
annual amount for life or, at his option, a reduced amount with continued
payments to a designated dependent after his death. He exercised the
option in favor of his wife, and at his death the Commissioner included in
his gross estate the value of the widow's survivorship annuity. The Tax
Court affirmed ' the Commissioner's ruling, but the circuit court reversed
on the ground that there was no transfer of property by the decedent tak-
ing effect at death.2 Higgs v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1950).
The original federal estate tax law 3 was designed to tax not only
transfers of property by will or intestacy, but also gifts nominally made
during the donor's lifetime which did not actually take effect in possession
or enjoyment until his death. Because of the resulting confusion as to
when an inter vivos transfer is treated as incomplete for estate tax purposes,
4
Congress later expressly provided 5 that any transfer, by trust or otherwise,
under which the grantor retained the income from the property for life,
was subject to tax upon his death. 6 Thus, decedents were frustrated in
their efforts to avoid the progressive rates of the inheritance tax by divesting
themselves of legal title to all their property during their lives while re-
serving a life estate. Efforts to accomplish the same end by the purchase
of joint and survivor annuity contracts, under which an insurance company
agrees to make payments to the purchaser for life, and then to a second
18. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Honey, 63 Fed. 39 (8th Cir. 1894).
19. See PROSSER, TORTS 945 (1941).
1. William J. Higgs, 12 T.C. 280 (1949).
2. INT. REV. CODE § 811 (c).
3. Revenue Act of 1916, 39 STAT. 756, 777 (1916).
4. See Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Commissioner v. Church, 335 U.S. 632
(1949).
5. Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, 46 STAT. 1516 (1931). "(c) . . . including
a transfer under which the transferor has retained for his life . . . the possession
or enjoyment of, or the income from, the property. . . ." See note 9 infra.
6. The transfer is also subject to a gift tax at the time made, but payments under
this tax are credited toward the estate tax. Smith v. Shaugnessy, 318 U.S. 176
(1943).
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annuitant after the purchaser's death, have proven similarly futile. 7 The
value of the survivor annuitant's interest has been included in the pur-
chaser's gross estate on the theory that the payments received by the pur-
chaser during his life represent income from the money he gave as con-
sideration for the insurer's promise. The instant case is the first involving
the taxability of the survivor's interest in an annuity purchased by someone
other than the first annuitant. The Tax Court ruled that although the
decedent did not provide the consideration for the contract, he effectuated
a transfer of property by exercising the option which enabled his wife to
participate in the annuity payments. In reversing, the circuit court held
that even assuming the exercise of the option to be a "transfer", there was
no reservation of any life interest by the decedent, since he had nothing
more than a life interest himself, coupled with a right to reduce it in favor
of his wife.
In exempting the widow's survivorship interest from estate taxation,
the circuit court seems to have disregarded the effect of the transaction upon
the decedent's rights under the contract. Immediately prior to exercising
the option he had an indefeasible interest in the benefits of the pension
plan.8 By reducing his own annuity in order that his wife could continue
to receive payments after his death, he diverted funds which would other-
wise have probably gone into his estate. If he had accepted the larger
payments and left part of them to his wife by will, or reinvested them in a
similar joint and survivor annuity, there would be no doubt as to the
taxability of her interest on his death. After he authorized the insurance
company to pay over to his wife a portion of the money to which he had
a right, decedent was still entitled to receive an annual payment for the rest
of his life. In holding that this does not amount to the reservation of a
life estate within the meaning of the Code, the court appears to have mis-
interpreted both the essential nature of the transaction and the intent of
Congress. Under this decision a decedent can arrange with his employer
to apply future earnings toward the purchase of annuity benefits which the
decedent can, at his election, pass to his survivors free of the estate tax. If
the survivorship interest in such an annuity is includible in the employee's
gross estate when he provides the funds for the contract directly, it is not
likely that Congress intended a different result when he accomplishes the
same end through the instrumentality of another.9
7. See Mearkle's Estate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1942); Com-
missioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 821 (1941) ; Com-
missioner v. Wilder's Estate, 118 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 634
(1941).
8. At the date of the exercise he had already become eligible for immediate retire-
ment.
9. Had the option been exercised after October 7, 1949, the court would have
had to take cognizance of § 811(c) (3) of the Code, which provides that an interest
in property transferred after that date by a decedent ". . . shall be included in his
gross estate . . . (whether or not the decedent retained any right or interest in the
property transferred) if . . . possession or enjoyment of the property can, through
ownership of such interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent; . . ." This
section has not yet been interpreted by the courts.
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International Law-United Nations Is Competent to Maintain
Suit against United States in United States Court in Actions Where
the United States Has Already Waived Sovereign Immunity-The
International Children's Emergency Fund of the United Nations shipped a
quantity of powdered milk on a vessel owned by the United States. Part
of the shipment was never delivered and part arrived in a damaged condi-
tion. To recover for the cargo loss and damage the United Nations brought
a libel against the United States in a district court. The court held that
the United Nations could maintain this suit, overruling exceptions (1) to
the competency of the United Nations to maintain suits in the courts of the
United States and (2) to the capacity of the United Nations to sue the
sovereign government of the United States. Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v.
United States, 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Calif. 1950).
The first exception raised the question whether an international organ-
ization has standing to sue in a national court. It is obvious that an inter-
national organization may be seriously hampered in the performance of its
functions by not being able to institute legal proceedings in national courts.1
However, such legal capacity must be conferred by member nations 2 To
make perfectly clear that the United Nations has legal standing in national
courts a provision to this effect was included in the Charter itself.3 Article
104 of the Charter obligates each member to accord the organization "such
legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
fulfillment of its purposes." 4 This article envisaged implementation by
national legislation, administrative action, or international agreement,5 much
of which has already been accomplished. The Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations, further defines the meaning and intent of Article
104 by providing that the United Nations shall have the capacity to institute
legal proceedings. 6 The United States, though it has not acceded to the
Convention, has by a prior federal statute, the International Organizations
Immunities Act, recognized that international organizations possess the
1. GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHAR aT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 519 (2d ed. 1949).
2. Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference, De-
partment of State Publication 2349, Conference Series 71 157 (1945). There was
no explicit provision in the Covenant of the League of Nations giving it legal capacity
to sue, but this capacity was recognized by an agreement between the League and
the Swiss Government. Doc. C.555.1926.V, LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICLAL JOURNAL,
7th Year 1422 (1926). For comment see 1 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
224 (1931).
3. See note 2 supra.
4. 59 STAT. 1053 (1945).
5. See GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 1, at 520; KELSEN, THE
LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 337 (1950) ; Jenks, Legal Personality of International
Organizations, 22 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 267, 271 (1945).
But cf. Curran v. City of New York, 191 Misc. 229, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct.
1947).
6. Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the First Part of the
First Session from Jan. 10 to Feb. 14, 1946, Doc. A/64 25 (1946) ; UNITED
NATIONS YEARBOOK, 1946-1947 99 (1946). See also speech by Attorney-General
of United Kingdom urging adoption of the Convention, Official Records of the
First Part of the First Session of the General Assembly 452 (1946).
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capacity to institute legal proceedings "to the extent consistent with the
instrument creating them." 7 By executive order the United Nations was
designated one of the organizations entitled to enjoy the privileges con-
ferred by this Act.8 The capacity of the United Nations to maintain a libel
for loss and damage of powdered milk destined for the children of Europe
is consistent with the instrument creating the United Nations, since the
Charter makes the solution of international health problems a responsibility
of the Organization.9 By virtue of the International Organizations Im-
munities Act the court had little difficulty in finding the United Nations
competent to institute proceedings in a court of the United States. Its
decision, the first applying this statute, clearly gave effect to the purpose
of the Act, which was to grant international organizations legal status
adequate to insure the effective performance of their functions.' 0
Whether the United Nations may sue the United States presented a
more difficult question, in view of the fact that a state is immune from suit
in its own courts without its consent." The instant court found the neces-
sary consent in the Suits in Admiralty Act, Section 2 of which permits a
libel in personam to be brought against the United States in respect to its
own merchant vessels, where, if such vessels were privately owned or
operated, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained.x  It has been
argued that because a waiver of sovereign immunity should be strictly con-
strued in favor of the sovereign, consent to be sued under this statute should
not be found in favor of the United Nations, which could not have been
within the contemplation of Congress when the Act was passed.'3 The
court rejected this interpretation, preferring to read the Suits in Admiralty
Act as a remedial statute for th6 recompense of all those injured by the
Government, 14 a reading also in accord with the tendency to restrict the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in cases where the Government branches
out into private business or trade.' 5
The present decision is the first to permit an international organization
to maintain an action against a member nation in a national court. That it
makes a notable contribution to the vitality of international organizations
is apparent. But its significance should not be overestimated. The court
decided a narrow issue on the basis of two statutes which virtually com-
pelled the result reached. At most the case is authority for the proposition
that the United Nations may sue a consenting member in its own courts.
7. Section 2(a) of the Act, 59 STAT. 669 (1945), 22 U.S.C. §288a(a) (Supp.
1949).
8. Exec. Order No. 9698, 11 FED. REG. 1809 (1946).
9. U.N. CHARTER Art. 55b, 59 STAT. 1045 (1945).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
946 (1945).
11. Raymond, Sovereign Immunity in Modern Admiralty Law, 9 TEx. L. REv.
519, 522 (1931).
12. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §742 (1946).
13. Respondents' Points and Authorities in Support of Exceptions to Libel,p. 8.14. See Byonnes v. United States, 298 Fed. 123, 124 (1923).
15. Note, Claims in Admiralty against a Governnent, 70 U. OF PA. L. REv. 322,
325 (1922).
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Even this doctrine is enunciated not without reservation. To allay the fears
of those who might otherwise have seen in its decision an infringement of
national sovereignty the court pointed out that the claim in question had
no political overtones and, consequently, that its decision could not result
in "embarrassment" to the United States. 6 These statements may have
unfortunate consequences insofar as they provide any authority for a future
doctrine that the United Nations can never sue the United States, even if
the latter has waived its immunity, unless the United States will suffer no
political embarrassment from the suit. By embarrassment the court seems
to mean loss of prestige in the conduct of international affairs. While it is
difficult to conceive of a case where the maintenance of an action against
the United States by the United Nations under an enabling statute, like
the Suits in Admiralty Act,' 7 would handicap the United States in the
conduct of its foreign relations, should such a case arise, the United States,
having waived its immunity in general terms, should be held to have as-
sumed the risk of discomfiture. Not only is there no reason to put more
obstacles in the way of an action by the United Nations under a remedial
statute than by a private individual, but, as the instant court recognizes,
the United Nations and the United States have common interests; there-
fore, equitable settlement of any legitimate claim for damages that the
United Nations may have against this country would be advantageous to
both parties.
18
16. Instant case at 833.
17. For discussion of the most recent statute waiving sovereign immunity see
Note, The Courts and the Federal Tort Claims ACt, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 884
(1950).
18. Instant case at 834.
